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THE ATTAINMENT OF PAY 
EQUITY BETWEEN THE SEXES BY 
LEGAL MEANS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
George E. Johnson* and Gary R. Solon** 
During the past few years there has been considerable discus-
sion of proposals to increase the equity of the compensation sys-
tem in the United States. Why, many people have asked, should 
society tolerate a system in which different workers with virtu-
ally identical productive characteristics-education, training, ex-
perience, and the like-receive very different wage rates? In par-
ticular, is it right for women to be paid less than men who 
appear to make roughly equal contributions to the output of the 
economy? The disturbing fact is that the ratio of women's to 
men's earnings has remained at approximately sixty percent 
throughout the postwar period. 1 Although this figure is a mis-
leading representation of the extent to which women are dis-
criminated against in the labor market because it fails to adjust 
for differences in hours worked and several other important fac-
tors discussed below, the fact remains that there has been little 
discernible progress in the relative labor market status of women 
despite the passage in the mid-1960's of far-reaching civil rights 
legislation.2 Whether the Equal Pay Act of 19633 and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" have been poorly enforced or 
were addressed to the wrong problems, these laws do not appear 
to have had a substantial impact on the underlying problem. 
This has led to new proposals, most notably comparable worth, 
to "do something" about the inequity of the present compensa-
tion system. 
* Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; affiliated with University of Michi-
gan's Institute of Public Policy Studies; Ph.D., 1966, University of California at 
Berkeley. 
** Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; affiliated with University 
of Michigan's Institute of Public Policy Studies; Ph.D., 1983, Princeton University. 
1. For a thorough analysis of trends in the sex-earnings differential, see O'Neill, The 
Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, J. LAB. EcoN., Jan. 1985, at 
S91 (Supp.). 
2. Id. 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
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Some of the roughly forty percent average pay disparity be-
tween men and women can be explained by factors that most 
people would agree are justifiable. Numerous studies using 
microdata-observations on individuals rather than group aver-
ages-have attempted to decompose the average wage difference 
between men and women into the part attributable to differ-
ences in productivity characteristics and the remainder that is 
considered to be due to labor market discrimination of one sort 
or another. 11 Although these studies are somewhat imperfect be-
cause of data limitations, they suggest that about half of the 
forty percent gap can be explained by "nondiscriminatory" vari-
ables, principally the average difference between men and 
women in the ratio of actual to potential labor market experi-
ence. None of the economywide studies finds that there is a zero 
economywide earnings gap between the sexes even after adjust-
ment for all available relevant variables. 
The purpose of this Article is to present an analysis of the gap 
between men's and women's wages with particular emphasis on 
the likely effects of various existing and proposed legal remedies. 
Part I sets out a simple "ideal" statistical model of wage deter-
mination. Its purpose is to identify carefully the potential im-
pact of alternative legal remedies such as the Equal Pay Act, 
Title VII, and proposed policies like comparable worth. This 
model is ideal in the sense that, although it could be estimated 
in principle, there is no data set currently available with which it 
could actually be estimated. Part II explores the impact of these 
various legal remedies on individual organizations, because each 
existing or proposed remedy would be implemented on an organ-
ization-by-organization basis rather than on an economywide ba-
sis. Part III addresses the empirical dimensions of the problem 
raised by the comparable worth movement-the average wage 
disparity between "men's jobs" and "women's jobs." We initially 
offer a range of estimates of the potential impact of comparable 
worth on the average male-female wage gap in the United States 
based on the assumption that there would be no secondary ef-
fects on employment, relative prices, and other wage levels. This 
assumption is lifted in Part IV, which discusses the adjustments 
that organizations affected by comparable worth or other laws 
would make in their employment of different types of labor, the 
5. See, e.g., Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and Earn-
ings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1979); Oaxaca, 
Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT'L ECON. REV. 693 
(1973). 
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associated wage rates, and their product prices. Consideration of 
these secondary effects implies that legal interventions designed 
to improve the relative labor market status of women might 
have very different effects from those expected under the zero-
adjustment assumption of Part III. 
I. A COMPLETE MODEL OF WAGE DETERMINATION 
The specification of a comprehensive model of the determi-
nants of individual wage rates provides a useful starting point 
for a systematic analysis of the potential impact of different an-
tidiscrimination policies. We will specify a very general "earn-
ings function" in which the wage rate per unit of time is consid-
ered a function of several sets of explanatory variables, that is 
(1) W = W(PC,LOC,J,E,MON,R,S,L), 
where the sets of variables represent the following: 
PC: personal productivity characteristics, such as edu-
cation, training, experience, and ability 
LOC: locational description, such as region, city size, 
and the like 
J: particular job held by individual 
E: employer 
MON: monopoly factors, such as member of umon, 
public employee, and the like 
R: race of individual 
S: sex of individual 
L: luck, or any other random elements, not related to 
the other explanatory variables, that influence W. 
The earnings function may be written in linear form as 
(2) W = aPC + bLOC + cJ + dE + eMON + tR + gS + L, 
where the different sets of parameters (a, . . ., g) represent the 
effects of the sets of explanatory variables on wages. It is con-
venient to define Was the natural logarithm of the wage rate, so 
that changes in any one of the elements of the sets of explana-
tory variables affect the predicted wage of each individual pro-
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portionately rather than absolutely. For example, if S is speci-
fied as a dummy variable for males-that is, its value is one for 
men and zero for women-the estimated value of g indicates the 
proportionate wage advantage of men relative to women. If the 
esti;mated value of g were .20, this would imply that, holding 
other things (personal characteristics, ... , race) constant, men 
on average earn exp(.20) - 1 = 22.1 % more than women. 
The model embodied in equation (1) can be employed to ana-
lyze the potential impact of various antidiscrimination policies. 
First, however, it should be pointed out that no one has ever 
estimated a model as comprehensive as this because no real 
world data set contains all the variables that can be considered 
to influence wages. In the PC (personal productivity characteris-
tics) set, for example, our hypothetical data set would have mea-
sures of motivation and individual ability that are almost never 
available to researchers. In many data sets, in fact, years of ac-
tual labor market experience are proxied by years of potential 
experience (age minus years of school completed minus six). Be-
cause women tend to have less actual experience per year of po-
tential experience than do men, due to different life cycle pat-
terns of labor force attachment, estimates of g (the 
proportionate earnings advantage of men) based on these data 
sets are biased in an upward direction. Our hypothetical data 
set, however, is free of any problems associated with "omitted 
variables." 
The second interesting feature of the earnings function model 
is that it can be used to decompose the average difference in the 
wages of men and women into portions attributable to differ-
ences in the average values of each of the different sets of char-
acteristics. Let D(W) be the difference between the average loga-
rithm of the wage for men and that for women. Thus, if, for 
example, women's hourly wages averaged two-thirds of men's, 
D(W) would take the value of approximately log(l.5) = .405. 
Similarly, let D(PC), D(LOC), etc. represent the differences be-
tween the average values for men and women of the various sets 
of explanatory variables used in equation (2). It therefore fol-
lows that the difference in average log wages is given by 
(3) D(W) = aD(PC) + bD(LOC) + cD(J) + dD(E) + eD(MON) + fD(R) + g.6 
6. The luck variable (the random error term) is assumed to be uncorrelated with sex 
so that D(L) = 0. 
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The value of aD(PC) reflects the effect of differences in personal 
productivity characteristics on D(W), and past estimates, such 
as those of Corcoran and Duncan, have attributed roughly half 
of D(W) to differences in the average values of personal produc-
tivity characteristics that can be observed. 7 
Another variable shown to have a significant impact on D(W) 
is the MON variable. Specifically, the impact of union member-
ship status on the logarithm of wages has been estimated to be 
about .20 during the latter 1970's,8 when average union member-
ship was about thirty percent for men and fifteen percent for 
women.9 Thus, the effect of unionism on the proportionate wage 
advantage of men is estimated to be .20 * (.30 - .15) = .03, or 
about eight percent of the average wage gap. 
Two things that most empirical studies of wage determination 
do not control for are the detailed job and employer of the indi-
vidual. This is important in assessing the efficacy of existing civil 
rights legislation and the potential of proposals such as compa-
rable worth. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, for example, was 
designed to prevent sex differences in wages within particular 
jobs within particular firms. To assess whether or not there is 
general compliance with the Equal Pay Act, one would have to 
run a full version of the model embodied in equation (2); that is, 
the regression equation would have to include a variable for each 
employer represented by an individual in the sample. If the E 
variables were not included, a large estimate of g might very well 
reflect that the average male is employed by an organization 
that pays higher wages than the organization employing the av-
erage female. This may be considered a bad thing, but it does 
not reflect violation of the Equal Pay Act. 
The second set of variables usually omitted in empirical stud-
ies of women's and men's wages are those referring to the de-
tailed job performed by the individual (the J variables). To the 
extent that job categories held predominantly by women, like 
7. See Corcoran & Duncan, supra note 5. The literature stresses that one way dis-
crimination against women occurs is that women are rewarded less for some characteris-
tics than are men. To take account of this, a rather complicated procedure known as the 
Oaxaca decomposition, developed in Oaxaca, supra note 5, is used to obtain a good esti-
mate of g. We will assume that if the estimated coefficients for men and women in an 
analysis of our hypothetical data. set were different from one another-and that, of 
course, is an open, unanswerable question-the decomposition represented in equation 
(3) would reflect the appropriate Oaxaca adjustment. 
8. G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, PAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN'S AND MEN'S JOBS: 
THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH POLICY 26, Table I (Institute of 
Public Policy Studies, University of Mich., Discussion Paper No. 254, 1986). 
9. Id. 
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secretaries, librarians, and nurses, systematically earn less, other 
things (PC, LOC, etc.) held constant, than job categories held 
primarily by men, like truckdrivers, engineers, and medical doc-
tors, the omission of the J variables (a one-zero dummy variable 
for every detailed occupation) will produce a higher estimated 
coefficient on the dummy variable for men. As with the omission 
of the E variables, this will provide an upward biased estimate 
of the parameter g, which is supposed to represent the extent to 
which men performing the same job within the same organiza-
tion are overpaid relative to women, or women are underpaid 
relative to men. Indeed, the fact that women's jobs tend to be 
associated with lower compensation levels than men's jobs is the 
motivation behind the push for comparable worth.10 Parts III 
and IV say more about the quantitative dimensions of this 
problem. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to as-
sure all qualified applicants equal access to jobs in all organiza-
tions covered by the legislation. This raises the thorny question 
of how much of the differential "explained" by differences be-
tween men and women in job category and employer attach-
ment, cD(J) + dD(E) in equation (3), represents voluntary 
choices by women as opposed to exclusionary practices by em-
ployers. To the extent that the difference between the sexes in 
the distributions of J and E represents exclusion rather than 
choice, the coefficient on the male dummy variable in a regres-
sion like equation (2) with J and E excluded would reflect the 
potential of full enforcement of Title VII, along with the Equal 
Pay Act, for reducing the sex gap in wage rates. On the other 
hand, women may on average have different preferences than 
men for certain characteristics of jobs and employers; for exam-
ple, a smaller fraction of women than of men might prefer high-
paying jobs as coal miners to low-paying jobs as secretaries. To 
the extent that such preference differences are responsible for 
sex differences in occupation and employer, estimates of g with J 
and E omitted tend to overstate the potential impact of Title 
VII. 
10. COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION ANO ANALYSIS. NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, WOMEN, WoRK, AND WAGES at ix (1981) [hereinafter NRC REPORT). 
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II. THE IMPACT OF PAY EQUITY ON AN INDIVIDUAL 
ORGANIZATION 
189 
It is instructive to illustrate the operation of the rather ab-
stract model of wage determination set out in Part I by studying 
the potential impact of various pay equity measures on a hypo-
thetical organization. Because wage determination in the United 
States is decentralized, any laws, including the existing ones, 
must be enforced on an employer-by-employer basis. How a par-
ticular organization would be affected by a change in the legal 
environment is thus of considerable importance. 
The hypothetical firm is Schwine and Son Wholesale Furni-
ture, Inc. (S&S) of Toledo, Ohio. The company purchases house-
hold furnishings in large quantities from manufacturers who 
ship the merchandise to the Schwine warehouse; Schwine then 
fills orders from furniture retailers who pick up the merchandise 
at the warehouse. There are 237 employees at S&S, including 
the President and founder, Rudolph Sch wine, and the Vice-
President for Operations, Larry Schwine, Rudolph's son. The 
employment and annual salary distributions by each of the five 
major job categories are shown in table 1. 
Job 
Clerical 
Warehouse 
Sales 
Supervisory 
Management 
Table 1 
Employment and Salary Structure at Schwine 
& Son Wholesale Furniture, Inc., August 1985 
Number of Employees Salary ($000's) 
Total Men Women Entry Max. Average 
100 5 95 12 16 14 
100 95 5 15 19 17 
15 14 1 20 50 33 
20 15 5 20 36 28 
2 2 0 40 70 55 
The major function of the clerical job category is to make and 
take orders by phone and to record all transactions on the com-
pany computer. Warehouse workers unload incoming items, 
ranging from small appliances to couches and refrigerators, from 
trucks and boxcars, move them to the appropriate area in the 
warehouse, and then fill orders by loading them onto retailers' 
trucks. Sales workers travel to retail stores in the Greater To-
ledo area to induce retailers to deal with S&S rather than other 
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wholesalers. The supervisory job category involves supervising 
the activities of the clerical and warehouse workers. 
Ninety-five of the 106 women employees at S&S, or ninety 
percent, are employed as clericals as compared to just four per-
cent of men employees. There is no union representation at 
S&S, and Rudolph Schwine states that he sets compensation 
levels for the different job categories so as to balance employee 
retention and motivation against the need to keep down labor 
costs. "I pay what I have to," Schwine once said, "but no more." 
The annualized labor cost, neglecting fringe benefits, is 
$4,265,000. 
The average annual salary of women at S&S is $14,800 as con-
trasted with men, exclusive of the Schwines, whose average an-
nual salary is $20,100. This represents an average disparity of 
$5,300 or a 35.8 % wage advantage for men, a 26.4 % wage disad-
vantage for women. We now ask what the potential is for alter-
native antidiscrimination laws to improve the status of women 
at S&S. 
First, application of the Equal Pay Act to S&S would not be 
very promising. The slight disparity between the average salaries 
of men and women employed as clericals is fully explained by 
the fact that the five males in this category have, on average, 
several more years of tenure with the company than do the 
ninety-five females. For warehouse workers, the average salaries 
of men and women are virtually identical. The sole woman on 
the sales force took that position five months ago and receives 
the same salary as three males with similar seniority. The aver-
age salary of the five women supervisors is less than that of the 
fifteen men supervisors, but S&S justifies this on the grounds 
that the competitive salary level for supervisors of clericals, 
which includes all five of the women, is less than the competitive 
salary of supervisors of material handlers, which includes ten of 
the fifteen men. Supporting this defense is the fact that the five 
male clerical supervisors earn roughly the same as their fem ale 
counterparts. 
Second, S&S could be attacked because it has not hired many 
women in the higher paying jobs in the company, indicative of a 
possible Title VII violation. Indeed, in 1977 two investigators 
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission discussed 
hiring practices with Schwine and announced that there was am-
ple prima facie evidence indicating Title VII violations. Schwine 
and his attorneys never heard anything about this again. 
Schwine argued in 1977, and Larry would be prepared to so ar-
gue again in 1987, that the occupational structure at S&S re-
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fleets that women applicants generally express a strong pref er-
ence for clerical as opposed to materials movement jobs in the 
warehouse despite the difference in remuneration. Further, any 
clerical worker can apply for a warehouse job or a promotion to 
supervisor whenever there is a vacancy. "Hell," said Schwine, 
"they don't want to move over to the warehouse, and our super-
visors are promoted from the ranks on a competitive basis. I 
would defend every damned decision we've made." The sex dis-
tribution of the sales force is more of a problem for S&S. 
Schwine's attorneys advised him that his defense on this-"No 
retailer in Maumee is ever going to buy twenty refrigerators 
from a woman salesman!"-would not fly in court. In any event, 
possibly because the target population is too small to involve a 
large potential judgment or settlement, there is no legal action 
pending against S&S at the present time. 
Existing equal opportunity legislation will therefore be un-
likely to have a significant effect on firms like S&S, even though 
there is a large gap between the wages of men and women in 
these companies. To do anything about the economywide wage 
differential by sex, society has to do something about the indi-
vidual Schwines. One possibility would be to pass a bill requir-
ing that each firm adhere to a set of automatic affirmative action 
guidelines (AAAG). The AAAG law would require that each em-
ploying unit must prove that it hires women in each of its job 
categories at least in proportion to a certain specified set of quo-
tas as determined by experts in the United States Office of Au-
tomatic Affirmative Action (OAAA). The simplest quota would 
be the fraction of all workers who are women, currently about 
.44, 11 across all occupations. A more interesting possibility for 
setting quotas would be based on an attempt to estimate what 
the sex distribution of jobs would be if there were no 
discrimination. 
Application of AAAG to Mr. Schwine's company would mean 
that S&S would have to alter its work force to meet whatever 
quotas are set by the OAAA for the four nonmanagerial job cate-
gories or be subject to whatever fine is established for noncom-
pliance. Suppose that the quotas were set for the clerical, ware-
house, sales, and supervisory job categories at, respectively, .60, 
.35, .40, and .40. Presumably each organization in the economy 
would be given a fairly long period of time to meet these quotas; 
otherwise, each firm would have to fire large numbers of male 
11. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT 13, 290 Table B-32 (1986), 
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employees with an attendant-perhaps lethal-disruption in 
production. This means, essentially, that all vacancies in the 
warehouse, sales, and supervisory job categories over the next 
several years would have to be filled by women. 
A program like AAAG is not going to take hold in the United 
States political system. If only a relatively small number of busi-
ness firms were subject to its provisions, these firms would be 
driven out of business by firms that did not have to follow 
AAAG. If its provisions covered a large portion of the labor mar-
ket, there would be a political revolt on the part of the majority 
of the adult population that would be hurt by its provisions. We 
thus turn to an alternative policy, comparable worth, that, al-
though not yet enshrined in law, has received a great deal of 
legislative and judicial attention. 
Under comparable worth, the sex-neutrality of wages and sala-
ries within each organization would be subject to assessment by 
"job evaluation" procedures. Under these procedures, each job 
within an organization would be assigned points in each of sev-
eral dimensions such as skill requirements, responsibility, effort, 
and working conditions, and these scores would somehow be ag-
gregated to an overall index of the job's worth. If it appeared 
that the employer systematically paid lower wages in predomi-
nantly women's jobs than in predominantly men's jobs with sim-
ilar total scores, the employer would be in violation of the law 
and would be required to increase pay in women's jobs. 
Now consider what the existence of a law establishing compa-
rable worth would mean to our exemplary organization, S&S. 
Assume that comparable worth were established as an amend-
ment to the Equal Pay Act so that its strictures would be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis rather than automatically as in our 
hypothetical AAAG. The slogan underlying the amendment 
would be "equal pay for jobs of comparable value" rather than 
"equal pay for equal work." 
The most obvious target of opportunity at S&S is the $3,000 
average pay disparity between the clerical and warehouse job 
categories. Suppose some attorneys take on the case for the 
plaintiffs, the "class" of 100 clerical workers at S&S. The plain-
tiffs' attorneys hire the firm of Job Experts Limited (JEL) to 
perform job evaluations of the two relevant job categories to ob-
tain an objective, scientific measure of the relevant contribution 
of each to the output of S&S. JEL proceeds to rank each of the 
jobs with respect to four characteristics: (a) training require-
ments and intellectual demands, (b) responsibility and necessary 
individual judgment, (c) physical exertion required, and (d) poor 
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working environment. The scores, from 0 to 100, on each of 
these four characteristics are then averaged, assigning equal 
weights to each of the four characteristics, to provide an overall 
score for each job. If the compensation level for each job cate-
gory is related in a nondiscriminatory manner to its contribution 
to the production of the firm, JEL argues and is prepared to so 
testify in court, relative average compensation levels will be in 
proportion to their scores in the job evaluation. As can be seen 
in table 2, JEL's analysis of S&S concludes that the contribu-
tions of the two job categories are approximately equal and that, 
therefore, clerical and warehouse workers at S&S ought to be 
paid according to the same compensation scheme. 
Table 2 
Results of Job Evaluation of Clerical and Warehouse 
Job Categories at Schwine and Son by Job Evaluation 
Limited and Amendments by Defense Associates 
Results 
Characteristics 
(a) Training 
(b) Responsibility 
(c) Physical 
(d) Environment 
Clerical Average 
Warehouse Average 
Warehouse/Clerical 
Clerical 
60 
60 
3 
15 
JEL Results 
Warehouse 
34.50 
34.25 
0.993 
89 
5 
84 
40 
Weight 
.25 
.25 
.25 
.25 
DA 
Weight 
.36 
.11 
.33 
.20 
32.19 
39.15 
1.216 
Schwine's attorneys, having deposed the JEL experts, hire 
their own independent experts, a group from Defense Associates 
(DA). The DA group, after a lengthy-and rather 
costly-analysis, concludes that there is nothing wrong with the 
scores assigned by JEL to each characteristic for the two job cat-
egories. They do, however, disagree strongly with JEL's assump-
tion that each of the four characteristics are equally important 
determinants of relative contribution. DA proposes, instead, an 
alternative set of weights, shown on the right hand side of table 
2, that they argue are justified in the job evaluation literature 
and by several studies conducted by DA staff. Interestingly, the 
DA experts point out, their results suggest that the average sal-
ary of warehouse workers relative to that of clerical workers 
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should equal 1.216 as compared to its actual value of 17 /14 = 
1.214. 
This case is likely to go to court, and its outcome will depend 
on which set of experts the judge believes, as well as, of course, 
on his or her predisposition on the comparable worth question. 
There is no "scientific" way to resolve which set of experts is the 
more correct because proponents of comparable worth have ac-
knowledged that job evaluation procedures are "inherently judg-
mental."12 Their principal application with respect to compara-
ble worth is to provide some justification for raising pay levels 
for women's jobs relative to men's jobs. 
Assume that S&S loses this case and is directed by the judge 
to increase the salaries of its clerical workers by an average of 
$3,000 so that their disparity with the warehouse workers is 
eliminated. What would Schwine do? Would women workers, at 
S&S and in the Greater Toledo area generally, be better or 
worse off? Part IV returns to these and related questions. 
III. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 
COMPARABLE WORTH 
This Part provides some evidence about the potential impact 
of a hypothetical law that attempts to increase the equity of the 
United States compensation system by removing the differential 
in pay between men's and women's jobs. In terms of Part II, we 
assume that the comparable worth law applies to all employers 
in the economy and that the plaintiffs always win and the 
Schwines always lose. Further, we assume that employers make 
no adjustments after comparable worth is put into ef-
fect-specifically, that the higher wages they have to pay work-. 
ers in women's jobs have no impact on wages in men's jobs or on 
relative employment levels and prices. Both of these assump-
tions are unrealistic; unless comparable worth were set up to 
work automatically, there would be ample room for judgment on 
the part of the legal system-the Schwines would sometimes 
win-and, as Part IV will point out, there would be very signifi-
cant wage and employment effects. 
Under these assumptions, the potential impact of comparable 
worth on the average gap between the wages of men and women 
can be approximated by the negative of the differential effect of 
femaleness of job on the male wage advantage. Suppose that in-
12. NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 96. 
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stead of including a dummy variable for each occupation (the J 
variables) in equation (2) we include a single variable F, which 
stands for the fraction of all workers in that occupation who are 
women. The value of F varies from less than one percent, for 
firefighters, plumbers, and the like, to ninety-nine percent, for 
secretaries, housekeepers, and the like. To the extent that the 
wages of women's jobs are, other things equal, less than those for 
men's jobs, we would expect that the coefficient of F in an em-
pirical earnings function would be negative. This should be true 
for both men and women.13 
The linear version of this modified wage function is given by 
(4) W = mF + aPC + bLOC + dE + eMON + tR + gS + L, 
where, given that W is entered in logarithmic form, m represents 
the proportionate difference between wages in a completely fe-
male job (F=l) and a completely male job (F=O). The actual 
implementation of an equation like (4), of course, must be on 
the less than perfect data sets that are available to researchers. 
The resultant estimates of the relevant parameters, in particular 
m and g, are biased, but, alas, they are the only available 
estimates. 
A variety of estimates of the m parameter based on microdata 
from the May 1978 Current Population Survey are presented in 
table 3.14 
13. The five male clerical workers at S&S earn less than the 95 male warehouse work-
ers. The female warehouse workers earn more than clerical workers. 
14. The Current Population Survey is a monthly household survey conducted by the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Our data from the May 1978 survey contain observations on 
24,056 men and 19,412 women. For more detail on the data base and estimates, see 
G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8. 
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Table 3 
Estimates for Men and Women of the Proportionate 
Effect of Femaleness of Occupation on Wages With 
Alternative Adjustments for Other Factors 
Adjustments 
(a) none 
(b) full 
(c) limited 
(d) limited (less schooling and experience) 
(e) full (with 48 industry variables) 
(0 limited (with 48 industry variables) 
Men 
-.343 
-.168 
-.176 
-.233 
-.160 
-.157 
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Women 
-.244 
-.090 
-.085 
-.093 
-.068 
-.057 
Variables in full model (underscored variables are included in limited model): 
PC: schooling, experience (and its square), part time, marital status, 
children 
Occupational Characteristics: educational development, vocational prepa-
ration, required strength, physical demands, job environment, fraction 
part time 
LOC: region, city size 
R: black, other race 
E: 20 industry variables (or 48 industry variables) 
MON: union membership and representation, public employee 
The equations on which these estimates are based were esti-
mated separately for men and women because several of the co-
efficients clearly differed by sex. Three sets of facts are con-
tained in these parameter estimates. First, it is true for both 
men and women that wages are lower in women's than in men's 
jobs. 15 For example, for the case in which no adjustments are 
included-that is, W is related only to F-the estimated value of 
m is -.343 for men. This implies that for men the estimated ratio 
of the wage in a completely male job to an almost completely 
female job is exp(.343) = 1.409, or, for men, women's jobs pay 
29.0% less than men's jobs. For women, the men's job/women's 
job wage ratio is 1.276, or women's jobs pay 21.7% less than 
men's jobs. 
The second fact is that the magnitude of the effect of F on W 
is greater for men than for women. This is true for all variations 
of the model with different included control variables, and, in-
deed, the magnitude of the effect for men relative to women be-
comes greater when the number of included control variables is 
increased. 
15. The estimated standard errors of the various estimates of m range from .013 to 
.016, so the effect is highly significant in a statistical sense. 
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The third fact is that the negative relation between W and F 
falls as more control variables are added to the regression equa-
tion. Moving from no control variables, (a), to a full set of con-
trols, (b), the estimated ratio of the wages of men's to women's 
jobs falls from 1.409 to 1.183 for men and from 1.276 to 1.094 for 
women. Notice that instead of a full set of variables on the indi-
vidual's employer, this data set (like all other similar data sets) 
only permits the inclusion of industry control variables.18 These 
industry variables, it turns out, are responsible for the majority 
of the reduction in the absolute values in the estimated m's for 
men and women. Moreover, moving from the inclusion of twenty 
industry dummy variables to the inclusion of forty-eight indus-
try variables (from (b) to (e) and from (c) to (f)) reduces the 
estimated impact of F on W still further. We suggest that the 
absolute magnitudes of the estimates of m would be reduced still 
further if we could include a proper adjustment for each individ-
ual's employer rather than simply the industry in which the in-
dividual is employed. 
If the estimated coefficients on F had been roughly the same 
for men and women, the task of estimating the initial impact of 
comparable worth on D(W), the proportionate wage advantage 
of men over women, would be rather straightforward. The mean 
value of F is .21 for men and . 71 for women, so the difference 
between men and women in the mean value of this variable is 
D(F) = -.50. If the m for both sexes were, say, -.15, the contri-
bution of the differential effect of femaleness of job to the male-
female wage gap would be (-.15) * (-.50) = .075. This would 
mean that a comparable worth law that was applied throughout 
the economy and had no secondary effects would eliminate .075 
of the gross male wage advantage, which was equal to .411 in the 
1978 Current Population Survey sample, or eighteen percent of 
the gap. 
It turns out, of course, that we cannot assume that m is the 
same for men and women; its absolute value is significantly 
greater for men than for women in all specifications of the model 
reported in table 3. To know how comparable worth would affect 
the wage structure and the economy, it is necessary to under-
stand why we get the consistent result that femaleness of job 
lowers the wages of men more than it lowers the wages of 
women. The most plausible explanation we can think of is that 
high-paying firms pay premiums in certain, primarily male job 
16. The industry variables are 20 dummy variables indicating in which industry the 
individual works: mining, construction, durable goods manufacturing, etc. 
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categories to attract workers with low turnover rates. Because 
women have higher average turnover rates than men,17 these 
firms are less likely than lower paying, high-turnover firms to 
hire women in these positions. On average, then, women in an 
occupation with a large proportion of males earn less relative to 
males in the same occupation than do women in an occupation 
with a large proportion of females. The argument does not apply 
in reverse to males in occupations with a large proportion of fe-
males, for employers gear their work and supervisory patterns in 
these jobs to the expected work pattern of women. This argu-
ment, which is not "proven" but, rather, merely consistent with 
the second fact mentioned above, does imply a greater penalty 
to the average man taking a job held primarily by women than 
to the average woman doing the same thing. 
If this explanation, or a related variant of it, is the reason for 
the sex difference in the estimated. values of m, it is straightfor-
ward to show that the initial impact of comparable worth on the 
male-fem ale wage differential is bracketed by the estimates ob-
tained by using the coefficients of W on F for men and for 
women. For the full model, the (b) estimates in table 3, the ef-
fect of comparable worth is seen to be between .090 * .5 = .045 
and .168 * .5 = .084.18 
The remaining question concerns which adjustments in earn-
ings in table 3 are appropriate. This is equivalent to the ques-
tion of which variables employers would be allowed to use for 
determining pay under comparable worth. If they would have to 
base pay primarily or solely on job characteristics, rather than 
worker characteristics, then the results from the limited specifi-
cations are more relevant. On the other hand, if "worker charac-
teristics regarded as legitimate compensable factors" also were 
allowed, as recommended in a National Research Council re-
port, 19 the full specifications might be more relevant. In any 
case, it is clear that whatever form comparable worth eventually 
takes it will be administered on an employer-by-employer basis 
rather than on an economywide, industrywide, or areawide basis. 
Thus, inferences about the likely initial effects are best based on 
a model that includes as much detail as possible on the industry 
in which the individual is employed. Once our most detailed in-
17. See, e.g., Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. 
ECON. REV. 716, 723 (1982). 
18. Demonstration of the result that the "true" effect of comparable worth is brack-
eted by the estimates from the male and female coefficients is (somewhat tediously) 
given in G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8. 
19. NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 86. 
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dustry variables are included, there is not very much difference 
between the full and limited specifications in the estimated m's. 
In either case, the estimated impact of comparable worth on the 
male-female wage differential is between about .03 and .08. 
These estimates are based on the explicit assumption that 
comparable worth would effectively cover the entire economy. 
This would not be true, though, if very small firms were ex-
cluded from coverage as they are presently under the Equal Pay 
Act20 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.21 Further, moder-
ately small firms, although formally subject to comparable 
worth, might be effectively uncovered because the affected clas-
ses might be too small to motivate plaintiffs and/or attorneys to 
undertake litigation. Finally, if the comparable worth law were 
worded as ambiguously as its precursors, some noncomplying 
firms would win their cases, which would further reduce the 
law's impact. 
IV. LONG RUN IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH AND 
OTHER PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION 
The results in Part III are based on the explicit assumption 
that comparable worth would have no impact on relative prod-
uct prices, the wages of other types of labor, that is, for men's 
jobs, or relative employment demand in organizations affected 
by the law. This is, in fact, an unrealistic assumption, and this 
Part investigates the impact of comparable worth and other fair 
employment laws in a longer run context. 
First, consider the impact on S&S of a victory by the plaintiffs 
in the hypothetical comparable worth suit discussed in Part II. 
S&S's total wage costs of $4.3 million are increased by 
$300,000-$3000 per clerical worker times 100 employees in that 
category-or by seven percent. Obviously, Schwine will be 
forced to make some adjustments in the production process of 
the company. Larry Schwine has been trying for some time to 
get his father to agree to an order system that makes use of a 
centralized computer. Schwine Senior has rejected this on the 
grounds that "my girls can do better than that (expletive de-
leted) computer any day." Upon the loss of the comparable 
worth case, Larry immediately shows Papa that the company 
can reduce its clerical work force to just fifty of the original one 
20. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)-(2) (1982). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
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hundred as long as they hire five computer operators, and that 
this move would, in the long run, save S&S $175,000 per year. 
Another possibility is that S&S will no longer be able to com-
pete in the wholesale furniture business and will have to close. 
This will depend upon whether the competition also has been 
forced to abide by the new comparable worth law. If the other 
firms in the industry are not forced to raise their clerical wages, 
they will have a price advantage over S&S whether or not the 
Schwines decide to "automate."22 
In either event, at least some, and possibly all, of the incum-
bent clerical workers at S&S are going to lose their jobs and will 
be forced to seek employment elsewhere. Many other organiza-
tions in the Toledo area-the Jeep plant, the Lucas County gov-
ernment, and several other large employers-have also been 
forced to raise the wages of their clerical workers and have made 
the appropriate employment adjustments, so there are a lot of 
people looking for clerical jobs in the area and, because compa-
rable worth is a national program, throughout the country. 
Many firms and industries, of course, are not covered by the law, 
and they find that, because of the new availability of clerical 
workers displaced from covered employment, they are able to 
hire all the clerical workers they want at lower wages than they 
used to pay. Further, many new firms that offer to sell busi-
nesses clerical services have sprung up. These firms are careful 
not to have any men's jobs so that there is no obvious compari-
son group necessary for a successful comparable worth suit. 
They are able to off er clerical services to large firms affected by 
comparable worth at a price much lower than what it would cost 
the firms to produce these services with their own (overpriced) 
labor. 
It is straightforward to set out an economic model that inves-
tigates the effect of comparable worth on the average wage rates 
for women's jobs, both absolutely and relative to the wages of 
men's jobs. There are several directions that one can take in this 
sort of endeavor, but the basic elements of the problem are con-
tained in the following very simple model. Suppose that there 
are three jobs in the economy. Jobs 1 and 2 are both women's 
jobs, in the sense that most of them are held by women, and job 
3 is the men's job. Prior to the imposition of comparable worth, 
the wage rates of both jobs 1 and 2 are equal to sixty-five per-
cent of the wage for job 3, the men's job, which is, arbitrarily, 
22. If Larry's original proposal had been profitable before the unfavorable court deci-
sion, S&S-and the competition-would have put it in place already. 
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equal to one hundred. We will also assume that the total level of 
employment in the women's jobs is forty-five and that the em-
ployment level in job 3 is fifty-five. This corresponds to the rela-
tive proportions of men and women in the labor force. The level 
of real GNP due to labor services-that is, net of capital and 
other factors of production-is thus equal to 65 * 45 + 100 * 55 
= 8425. 
Now consider the imposition of a comparable worth law that 
covers job 1 but not job 2. Assume that the initial level of em-
ployment in both jobs 1 and 2 is 22.5, so that the law effectively 
covers fifty percent of employment in women's jobs. We will as-
sume that comparable worth increases the wage of job 1 to .75 of 
the wage of job 3 from the initial ratio of .65.23 What would hap-
pen to the wages and employment levels in the three jobs and to 
the level of GNP as a result of the imposition of comparable 
worth? First, assume that the level of GNP is determined by an 
aggregate production function with the employment levels of the 
three different jobs described above. This production function 
has a constant elasticity of substitution between the three labor 
inputs, which will be referred to as s. The larger the value of s 
the more readily employment of one type of labor can be substi-
tuted for each of the other types. The demand for each of the 
three types of labor depends negatively on its real wage level 
and also depends on the wage levels of the other two kinds of 
labor. The absolute own wage elasticity of labor demand is 
greater the higher the assumed value of s. 
The second key assumption of the model is that the total sup-
plies of labor to both women's jobs (jobs 1 and 2) and the men's 
job (job 3) are fixed. This means that any changes in the wage 
rates of the three jobs caused by the imposition of comparable 
worth is assumed to have no impact on either the aggregate la-
bor force or the fraction of the labor force that chooses to work 
in the two women's jobs versus the men's job. There are several 
ways in which this assumption could be altered,2 " but simulation 
results based on the simplest assumption are of considerable 
interest. 
These simulation results are shown in tables 4 and 5: 
23. This corresponds to a value of m of -.143. 
24. For example, the fraction of the labor force seeking women's jobs could be as-
sumed to depend positively on the ratio of the average wage of the two women's jobs to 
the wage of the men's job. 
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Table 4 
Impact of CW (as Described in Text) on GNP, 
Employment Levels, Wage Rates, and Average 
Wage Level for Women's Jobs 
GNP Nl N2 Wl W2 W3 
(a) Initial 8425 22.5 22.5 65.0 65.0 100.0 
(b) Free 8650 22.5 22.5 75.0 65.0 100.0 
Lunch +2.7% +15.4% 
(c) s=.5 8411 20.9 24.1 74.8 56.7 99.7 
-0.2% -7.1% +15.0% -12.8% -0.3% 
(d) s=l 8398 19.5 25.5 74.8 57.2 99.7 
-0.3% -13.3% +15.0% -12.0% -0.3% 
(e) s=2 8379 16.9 28.1 74.8 58.0 99.7 
-0.6% -24.9% +15.1 % -10.8% -0.3% 
(0 s=5 8344 11.0 34.0 74.9 59.7 99.8 
-1.0% -51.2% +15.2% -8.1% -0.2% 
Table 5 
Changes in GNP and Its Distribution in Response 
to CW for Alternative Elasticities of Substitution 
Change in Income of: 
Substitution 
Assumption GNP Job 1 Job 2 
(b) None .0267 .0267 0 
(c) s=.5 -.0017 .0242 -.0237 
(d) s=l -.0031 .0226 -.0237 
(e) s=2 -.0055 .0196 -.0233 
(0 s=5 -.0097 .0129 -.0213 
AV 
65.0 
70.0 
+7.7% 
65.1 
+0.1% 
64.8 
-0.3% 
64.3 
-1.1% 
63.4 
-2.4% 
Job 3 
0 
-.0022 
-.0020 
-.0018 
-.0013 
The initial values of GNP, the employment levels in the two 
women's jobs (Nl and N2), the three wage rates (Wl, W2, and 
W3), and the average wage of the two women's jobs (AV, which 
is weighted by the employment levels of the two jobs) are given 
in row (a) of table 4. Row (b) shows what happens to these vari-
ables on the assumption that comparable worth is a free lunch, 
i.e., the law has no impact on employment levels and other 
wages. Wl, the wage of the covered women's job, increases by 
15.4% to 75, and the average wage of women's jobs increases by 
7. 7 % to 70. The increase in the real wage bill for holders of job 1 
is equal to .0267 of the pre-comparable worth level of GNP. Be-
cause payments to the three types of labor must equal GNP at-
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tributable to labor services, the free lunch assumption implies 
that GNP must rise by 2.7%. However, because employment 
levels in the three jobs are assumed to be constant in the free 
lunch calculation, this scenario obviously cannot happen. Only 
Democrats before 1980 and Republicans after 1980 can make 
something from nothing. 
Rows (c) through (f) of tables 4 and 5 show the effects of com-
parable worth for different assumed elasticities of substitution 
when employers are free to make appropriate adjustments. For 
the low value of s (row (c)), 7.1 % of the initial holders of job 1 
are forced to transfer to job 2. Those initial holders of job 1 who 
are sufficiently lucky to retain their jobs experience a 15.0% 
wage increase, but other holders of women's jobs, those initially 
in job 2 and those who lost job 1, incur a 12.8% wage reduction. 
With s = .5, the average wage of all holders of women's jobs 
rises slightly, and the wage of the men's job falls by a little more 
than AV rises. For higher values of s, however, AV falls both 
absolutely and relative to W3. 
The reduction in GNP associated with comparable worth is 
fairly small as compared with its redistributive impact. For s = 
1, for example, GNP falls by 0.3%-about $12 billion in 1985 
terms. The real incomes of holders of men's jobs and of all hold-
ers of women's jobs also fall by 0.3 % . The important effect of 
comparable worth is a redistribution of income from workers in 
the women's job 2 to those who are lucky enough to obtain a 
covered women's job. The size of this transfer is much larger (by 
a factor of about eight) than the aggregate efficiency loss. This 
general result-that the major effect of comparable worth is to 
transfer income between women rather than from men to 
women workers-is quite insensitive to the assumed elasticity of 
intrafactor substitution in the economy. 2 ~ 
It could be argued that the "real world" effect of comparable 
worth on the absolute and relative earnings of women would be 
more favorable than is implied by the results of our simple 
model. First, many noneconomists might dispute our assumption 
that all or even a majority of organizations would react to the 
higher relative wages for their women's jobs by substituting ma-
chinery and other types of labor for women's jobs. This is, of 
course, an empirical question, and we would argue that there is a 
25. The available empirical evidence on the size of the substitution elasticity in the 
United States suggests that it is larger than one but finite, probably between 1.5 and 2. 
For a survey of this topic, see Hamermesh & Grant, Econometric Studies of Labor-Labor 
Substitution and Their Implications for Policy, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 518 (1979). 
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great deal of evidence against the notion that organiza-
tions-including governments and nonprofit institutions-are 
insensitive to relative prices when they make employment deci-
sions. Further, the availability of the "out-sourcing" option 
would tend to make many women's jobs more price sensitive 
than other types of labor in organizations. 
A second criticism might center on our assumption that the 
supply of labor to women's jobs would not be affected by the 
law. It is, in fact, not clear what would be the effect of altering 
this assumption. On the one hand, women who do not receive 
"good" women's jobs-that is, jobs in organizations effectively 
covered by comparable worth-might choose to take men's jobs 
or drop out of the labor force rather than accept a "bad" 
women's job-that is, a job in an organization not covered by 
comparable worth. This would reduce the negative impact of 
comparable worth on wages in uncovered women's jobs and 
would also, to a limited extent, reduce the average wage in men's 
jobs. On the other hand, the best outcome for someone who 
wanted a women's job prior to the imposition of comparable 
worth is to receive a high-paying women's job. If there is suffi-
ciently high turnover in these jobs, many people will queue for 
them and take temporary low-paying women's jobs in the 
meantime. Indeed, if comparable worth did increase the average 
wage of women's relative to men's jobs, a larger fraction of both 
women and men would probably decide to train for women's 
jobs. If, as is more likely, comparable worth had a negative im-
pact on the relative attractiveness of women's jobs, the resultant 
training decisions would lessen the negative relative wage impact 
of comparable worth. 
It should be pointed out that other antidiscrimination policies, 
such as a more vigorous enforcement of Title VII or the hypo-
thetical AAAG program discussed in Part II, may be subject to 
similar dismal conclusions concerning their long-run impact. 
Consider, for example, an economy in which there are two types 
of jobs, job A, which requires very little employer-specific train-
ing, and job B, which requires a great deal of such training. Ab-
stracting from other aspects of jobs-their educational require-
ments, nonpecuniary attributes, etc.-employers will obviously 
attempt to hire people for job B who can be expected to remain 
on the job for a long time. If, on the contrary, an organization 
trained applicants who were likely to quit after a relatively short 
stay with the firm, its costs would be higher than if it were care-
ful to train only applicants who could be expected to exhibit a 
low rate of labor turnover. Now assume that the expected num-
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her of years that any job applicant will stay with the firm is re-
lated to some function of observable characteristics that we shall 
call the applicant's "score." This would be related to his or her 
education and training, previous job history, and the like. As-
sume also that, given identical scores, women have shorter ex-
pected job attachment duration than men, or at least that em-
ployers believe this to be so. Given this assumption, a cost-
minimizing organization will obviously require a higher mini-
mum score for the women it hires to train for job B than for 
men.26 If it did not practice this form of "statistical discrimina-
tion" (and, for example, set the same hiring requirements for 
both sexes) and if women indeed have shorter average job dura-
tion than men with the same score, a nondiscriminating organi-
zation would incur higher costs than its discriminating competi-
tors. In a competitive situation, it would be driven out of 
business; if the organization were a government agency, it would 
be labeled as inefficient and its function recommended by the 
Grace Commission for contracting out to the private sector. 
Given the practice of statistical discrimination in this simple 
but very relevant model, if employers are correct in expecting 
shorter job duration for women, then the economy does operate 
at maximum efficiency. It is, however, not a "fair" outcome in 
the sense that women whose scores are equal to or a little above 
the cutoff for men are relegated to the lower paying job A rather 
than the higher paying job B. Further, because women receive a 
lower return on characteristics that raise their scores into the 
marginal range, they will have less incentive than men to acquire 
these characteristics. This tends to exacerbate sex differences in 
occupation which, of course, provide the underlying motivation 
for the comparable worth movement. 
Now consider the vigorous enforcement of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act in the context of this model. It would now be 
illegal for any organization to set different hiring standards for 
men and women. This means that the cutoff score to be hired 
into job B would be lowered for women and raised for men with 
the obvious result that more women and fewer men would enter 
the higher paying occupation. This would mean, because of the 
assumption that women have higher ceteris paribus turnover 
rates, that the aggregate level of GNP would fall to some extent 
due to the inefficiency caused by the increased training costs 
made necessary by the increased hiring of women for job B. 
26. See Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977). 
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The gainers from this policy would be the women who would 
be hired as B's under the new rules but would have been A's 
without it. Women with low scores (who would be A's both 
before and after the new policy) and with very high scores (B's 
in both regimes) and their male counterparts would incur a 
slight loss in income. 27 The big losers would be the men with 
marginal characteristics who would no longer be eligible to be 
B's because of the increase in the cutoff score for men. The ma-
jor difference between the Title VII and comparable worth op-
tions is that the big income transfer in the former is from men 
to women rather than between women in the latter. 
CONCLUSION 
We have examined several options for increasing the equity of 
the compensation system in the United States with particular 
emphasis on comparable worth. Our main concern is with the 
question of what economic effects a policy would have. Our main 
points are as follows: 
1. Between three and eight percentage points of the thirty-
five percent gap between the average wages of men and women 
is attributable to sex differences in occupation. 28 This range rep-
resents the maximum potential initial impact of a comparable 
worth law with universal coverage and compliance and no sec-
ondary effects. A comparable worth law of this form would also 
eliminate violations of the Equal Pay Act, but the available evi-
dence is that these are not quantitatively important. 29 In pro-
portionate terms, then, our estimates of the maximum potential 
initial impact of comparable worth range from eight to twenty-
three percent of the current wage gap, which is not, in our view, 
trivial. 
2. The actual implementation of a comparable worth law, as-
suming it contained enforcement mechanisms similar to those 
for the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
would not be comprehensive. This means that the wages of 
women's jobs in some organizations would be increased, but this 
would reduce employment in women's jobs in such organizations 
and would lower wages for women's jobs in organizations not ef-
fectively covered by the law. The effect of comparable worth on 
27. Their loss is similar to the fall in GNP in the comparable worth example. 
28. See supra Part III. 
29. G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
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the average compensation of women, both relatively and in real 
terms, is ambiguous, but the preponderance of evidence suggests 
that substitution elasticities between labor types are sufficiently 
large that the impact of comparable worth on the labor market 
status of women would likely be negative. By comparison, a vig-
orous enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act would 
raise the average labor market status of women, although some 
women would be hurt by the policy. 

